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A Field Experiment in Moral Suasion and Tax 
Compliance Focusing on Under-declaration and Over-
deduction 
Benno Torgler 
One of very few field experiments in tax compliance, this study generates a unique data set on 
Swiss taxpayers’ under-declaration of income and wealth and over-deductions of tax credits 
by obtaining exclusive access to tax return corrections made by the tax administration. Using 
this commune level data from Switzerland, it explores the influence on tax compliance of 
moral suasion, introduced through a treatment in which taxpayers receive a letter containing 
normative appeals signed by the commune’s fiscal commissioner. This letter also serves to 
operationalize elements of social identity and (mutual) trust. Interestingly, the results not only 
echo the earlier finding that moral suasion has barely any effect on taxpayer compliance but 
show clear differences between under-declaration and over-deduction.  
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1. Introduction 
The power of moral suasion or moral appeal as a persuasive tool is convincingly 
demonstrated in Cialdini’s (2007) seminal work on persuasion. Research in 
marketing, particularly, relies heavily on persuasion as a tool to influence human 
nature, treating advertising, for example, as a means of forming and changing 
attitudes and behaviours either consciously or outside conscious awareness. 
Economics, on the other hand, has been substantially more critical about persuasion. 
Some studies for instance, indicate that although moral suasion does not work when 
individuals or institutions (e.g., firms) are under strong competitive pressure, it can be 
a useful short-term tool to generate voluntary cooperation in emergency situations 
(e.g., through blood donations) or after a disaster (see, e.g., Baumol and Oates, 1979; 
De Alessi, 1975).  
Over the past 10 years, researchers have gathered substantial knowledge about 
how moral sentiments or social norms of compliance (tax morale) shape tax 
compliance and the factors that influence such sentiments (for an overview, see, e.g., 
Kirchler, 2007; Torgler, 2007). These observations indicate that social norms are 
crucial to understanding why people comply with the law. Less evidence is available, 
however, on how moral suasion or moral appeals shape tax compliance. One field 
experiment by Blumenthal, Christian, and Slemrod (2001), in collaboration with the 
Minnesota Department of Revenue, examines the impact of moral persuasion on 
voluntary income tax compliance with a focus on whether taxpayers who are subject 
to moral appeals change their reports to a greater extent than taxpayers who are not. 
These authors do not, however, have access to taxpayer return audits. They 
nevertheless provide evidence that those receiving the moral suasion treatment 
increase their income report on average by $220 more than the control group (0.8% of 
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the federal taxable income based on the average between the control and treatment 
groups), although the coefficient is not statistically significant. They also show that 
people with greater opportunities to evade or avoid taxes (e.g., the self-employed) are 
less susceptible to normative appeals. The minimal effect of moral suasion on 
taxpayers’ compliance behaviour is also demonstrated by Torgler’s (2004) 
exploration of moral suasion’s influence on the timely completion of 2001 tax forms 
and timely paying of taxes. This prior research is supplemented in this current study, 
which provides a unique opportunity to explore individuals’ under-declaration of 
income and wealth and over-deduction of tax credits. The letter used to trigger moral 
suasion serves also to operationalize social identity and (mutual) trust, which have 
been shown to influence tax compliance (for an overview, see Kirchler, 2007). Most 
importantly, unlike the researchers in previous tax compliance field experiments, for 
this present analysis I have obtained access to the tax return corrections made by the 
tax administration.   
 
2. Field Experimental Design 
2.1 Sample Description 
The experiment was conducted in the Swiss commune (municipality) of Trimbach, 
one of 2,596 communes in Switzerland and the smallest government division in the 
country. Trimbach is located in the north-west of Switzerland, close to the Aargau and 
Basel-Landschaft cantons. It is part of the canton of Solothurn which consists of 120 
communes. In January 2003, Trimbach had 3,497 taxpayers (56% of all the 
inhabitants in Trimbach). It is important to note that communes are financed through 
direct taxes and are fully responsible for the tax collection process. Swiss tax laws 
allow citizens to declare their own income and wealth and to make deductions. I 
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randomly selected 580 taxpayers to receive the 2001 tax form, 289 of whom also 
received the treatment letter. The recipients were randomly divided to balance the 
unobserved variables across two groups: a control (n = 289) and a treatment group (n 
= 291). However, the final number of observations for the key variables is lower (see 
Table 1) because of missing values; for example, a few taxpayers either did not fill 
out the tax form or left parts of it empty. The procedure of using only a subset of 
taxpayers (only 8% of the total of 3,497 taxpayers received the treatment letter) 
reduced any potential spill-over effect of individuals in the small community talking 
to each other between receiving the letter and taking the time to fill out the tax form. 
In addition, based on my own experience of living in Switzerland, as well as 
information provided by Trimbach’s tax administrator, Trimbach citizens tend not to 
be keen on talking about their own tax matters, which may reduce the likelihood of 
their discussing such a letter. Unfortunately, in the area of tax compliance, field 
experiments are limited because of heavy legal restrictions on the ability to test 
questions on such topics as tax rates or deterrence.1 Nevertheless, it is still possible to 
explore (soft) factors like moral suasion or the provision of rewards for compliance 
(Feld, Frey, and Torgler, 2006).  
The available statistics confirm that before the experimental treatment (i.e., in 
tax year 2000) the distributions for the control and the treatment group were very 
similar. The mean (median) taxable income was at 44,761 (40,403) Swiss Francs 
(CHF) for the control group and 44,427 (40,668) CHF for the treatment group with a 
standard deviation of 35,865 for the control and 36,667 for the treatment group. 
Torgler (2004) also reports that in the years before the field experiment compliance 
                                                 
1 For a recent large scale field experiment in Denmark using threat-of-audit letters, see Kleven et al. 
(2011).  
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such as the timely paying of taxes was highly consistent between the control and 
treatment.2  
 
2.2 The Treatment Letter as Instrument  
The treatment letter, shown with its translation in Appendix Figure A1, was designed 
in accordance with the three processing phrases of a persuasive message; namely, 
attention, comprehension, and acceptance of the message content (Hovland, 1959). 
The experimental treatment group received the letter in February 2002 immediately 
after all taxpayers had received the tax form, which increased the probability that 
those using professional assistance would read it. The letter, printed on pink paper to 
attract attention, was signed by the commune’s fiscal commissioner. Thus, I analyse 
the tax declaration for the tax period 2001 (income earned in 2001). To encourage 
taxpayer acceptance, it was reasonable in length and written in easily readable and 
comprehensible prose.   
In particular, the letter introduced the following moral suasion appeal:  
The taxes you pay are vital for maintaining the municipal tasks in Trimbach. If 
the taxpayers did not contribute their share, our commune with its 6,226 
inhabitants would suffer greatly. With your taxes, you help keep Trimbach 
attractive for its inhabitants… With your conscientious tax declaration you 
contribute to preserving this democratic and liberal structure.  
In line with Blumenthal et al. (2001), the message points to the importance of paying 
taxes voluntarily to guarantee the provision of public goods. Unlike Blumenthal et al. 
(2001), however, it also stipulates the number of inhabitants (6,226) in order to stress 
the closeness of the citizenry, which relates to social identification and can shape tax 
                                                 
2 Scale for timely paying: 3 = payment on time, remission of taxes, 2 = first request for payment, 1 = 
debt collection, 0 = taxes unpaid. Values for the control (treatment) group: 2.823 (2.823) in 1999 and 
2.808 (2.804) in 2000.  
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compliance (Kirchler, 2007, pp. 93–96). In fact, Wenzel (2002a) stresses that “people 
often seek justice within the context of groups to which they belong” (p. 2002), 
pointing out in a later study that “[t]axpayers’ identities affect their commitment and 
solidarities, their endorsement of certain values and goals, their internalization of 
social norms, and their emotions and motivations” (Wenzel 2007, p. 31). Wenzel 
(2002b) also explores whether perceived distributional justice has a stronger positive 
effect on tax compliance when social identification is stronger. His survey evidence 
provides some support for the importance of identification, particularly the interaction 
between identification and perceptions of justice. Likewise, Hartner et al. (2008) find 
that a positive effect of procedural fairness on tax compliance is mediated by national 
identity judgments, and Wenzel (2007) finds a positive influence of inclusive 
(national) and exclusive (individual) identity on tax ethics. Torgler (2005) also 
provides evidence that national pride shapes tax morale.  
The second paragraph of the letter signals that citizens are trusted, which 
serves to maintain the psychological tax contract between the tax administration and 
the taxpayers and encourage positive actions (Feld and Frey, 2002). Kirchler (2007) 
also notes that “[i]nteraction processes based on transparency and neutrality of the 
procedures, trustworthiness of tax institutions and tax authority and respectful, polite 
and dignified treatment of taxpayers are likely to enhance voluntary compliance” (p. 
203). Torgler (2003) further observes that trust in the legal system and trust in public 
officials has a positive impact on tax morale.3 Accordingly, Kirchler (2007) and 
Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl (2008) develop the ‘slippery slope’ framework of tax 
compliance in which high compliance can only be maintained through high levels of 
trust or power, with the impact of one dependent on the level of the other. A 
                                                 
3 See also Torgler (2007) for an overview of evidence on how trust shapes tax morale and Frey and 
Torgler (2007) and Alm and Torgler (2006) for further evidence.  
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downward spiral occurs when trust and power are at an intermediate level “because 
trust in the authorities is already undermined [and] monitoring and audits are seen as 
signals of a ‘cops and robbers’ attitude on behalf of the tax authorities and create even 
more distrust” (Kirchler, 2007, pp. 205–206). Empirical support for this slippery slope 
framework is provided in several recent studies based on experimental and survey 
data (Wahl, Kastlunger, and Kirchler, 2010; Kastlunger et al., 2013; Kogler et al., 
2013). The treatment letter covers the elements of (mutual) trust and procedural 
fairness using the following text:   
In Switzerland, unlike other countries, the citizens have the opportunity to 
actively participate in the legislative procedure. This advantage is also 
reflected in the tax legislation, which stipulates taxpayer self-declaration. This 
Swiss system presupposes that citizens have a sense of responsibility and are 
ready to maintain the functioning of municipalities, cantons, and the state. 
Although the selection of a small town such as Trimbach is discussed 
intensively elsewhere (Torgler, 2004), I should note here that a strong interaction at 
the local level (as is the case in Trimbach) can promote cooperation (Torgler, 
Schneider, and Schaltegger, 2010). Thus, if there is a moral suasion effect, it might be 
stronger at the local level (the upper-bound level estimate) than at a more centralized 
level, as observed in the experiment conducted by Blumenthal et al. (2001). On the 
other hand, if moral suasion does not work at the local level, it might be less likely to 
work at a more centralized level unless the local level provides alternative channels to 
enforce cooperation.  
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3. Measurement of Non-compliance 
3.1 Under-declaration of Income 
The reporting process in Switzerland comprises the following steps: Employees 
receive a wage statement directly from their company and add this to their tax 
declaration documents. Self-employed people or freelancers, in contrast, must fill out 
their own wage statements, possibly increasing the opportunities for tax evasion,4 
which is controlled for by multivariate analysis. Nevertheless, employees can also 
cheat on other sections by not reporting income from other sources (side lines, income 
based on securities and wealth, or property ownership). Such filing of false, distorted, 
or untruthful documents (e.g., wage statements, income statements, and balance 
sheets) for the purpose of tax evasion is punishable as a misdemeanour with a fine or 
a jail term up to three years.5  
I will focus on position 10 of the tax declaration sheet in Figure A2. This 
measures the total income and is the sum of the income from employment (position 
1), own business(es) (position 2), side lines (position 3), social security and insurance 
benefits, life annuities (position 4), yields on assets (dividends, interest etc., see 
position 5), other income and profits (position 6), and net income from real estate  
(position 9). To explore whether people in the treatment group are more likely to 
comply, I first build an income non-compliance variable, constructed using total 
income reported by the tax administration after the auditing process minus total 
income reported by the taxpayer in his/her tax form before the auditing process (i.e., 
deviations based on position 10). In other words, the dependent variable measures the 
income corrections made by the tax administration. The values are positive in the case 
                                                 
4 A detailed guideline on how to fill out the form is available online:  
http://www.so.ch/fileadmin/internet/fd/fsvaa/pdf/np/Merkblatt2007-Selbstaendige_A.pdf.  
5 See www.estv.admin.ch/ document “Die Strafbestimmungen bei den direkten Steuern”. 
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of under-declaration and negative if over-declaration is made. The tax administration 
inspects the tax forms submitted, allowing me to work with results from audited data. 
Therefore this experimental design permits a comprehensive analysis.  
 
3.2 Over-deduction  
As a proxy for non-compliance through over-deduction I use total deduction reported 
by the taxpayer minus total deductions approved by the tax administration after the 
auditing process. Thus, the variable measures the tax administrations’ correction in 
the tax declaration form based on observed deviations in the total deductions (position 
19, see Figure A3). Here, positive values indicate that taxpayers have reported higher 
deductions than actually allowed. Total deductions are the sum of occupational 
expenses (position 11), interest paid on debts (12), alimonies and annuity 
contributions (13), insurance premiums and interest on saving accounts (14-15), other 
deductions (16), health care costs (17), and special deductions if both spouses have a 
gainful occupation (18).  Of the various deductibles allowed, the most important in 
this case is professional expenses (position 11), which allow for some deduction 
flexibility (e.g., travel costs between home and work). These allowances include extra 
expenses, such as the additional costs needed to exercise work duties or extra costs 
incurred for night work, training, and/or cost control.6  
 
3.3 Under-declaration of Wealth 
The under-declaration of wealth is measured in a similar way, using total taxable 
wealth reported by the tax administration after the auditing process minus total 
taxable wealth reported by the taxpayer on the tax form before the auditing process. 
                                                 
6 A detailed list is available from the author upon request.  
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Therefore, in line with the other two dependent variables, this is a measure of 
corrections made by the tax administration, comparing the original completed tax 
forms with the final values provided by the tax administration. A positive value means 
that there was an under-declaration of wealth while a negative value indicates that 
individuals over-declared wealth in their tax forms. The declaration form, whose 
positions are given in Appendix Figure A4, requires that the taxpayer list real and 
personal property (see positions 31 (movable) and 32 (real estate)). It also provides a 
section on business assets for the self-employed (see position 33). Here, I use net 
taxable wealth (position 40) as the analytic variable to take into account that various 
deductions (liabilities (position 35) and allowances (position 37)) can be claimed from 
the value of all assets. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptive Results 
4.1.1 Income Under-declaration 
Table 1 summarizes the key results, focusing first on income under-declaration, which 
at 1,525 CHF is greater in the control group than in the treatment group, which has -
192 CHF in over-compliance. The nonparametric two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum 
(Mann-Whitney) test shows no statistically significant difference between the two 
groups, although interestingly, the standard deviation indicates more dispersion or 
variation in the control group distribution. Overall, it is worth noting that the size of 
non-compliance is quite small: based on the two mean values reported in Table 1, the 
share of 1,525 CHF is only 2.3% of the mean net taxable income. A tiny intergroup 
variation is observable: only 44% of the treatment group’s declarations escaped 
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correction of total income by the tax administration compared to 46% of control 
group declarations. Nevertheless, this difference is not statistically significant.   
 
4.1.2 Over-deduction 
The picture changes, however, for over-deduction, with the control group returning a 
positive mean value of 816 CHF and the treatment group an even higher mean value 
of 1,351 CHF. This difference is statistically significant. In 31.23% (34.96%) of the 
cases in the treatment group (control group), the tax administration made no changes 
to the tax return, indicating here no significant differences between these two groups. 
In 55% (53%) of the cases, taxpayers claimed higher deductions than allowed, a 
difference that although not statistically significant, represents an over-deduction that, 
at 816 CHF or 6.13% of the mean net deductions post correction, is relatively large 
compared to the income shares. Nevertheless, in over 50% of the cases in both 
groups, the amount of over-deduction is less than 10,000 CHF.  A substantial control-
treatment group difference does emerge, however, in the section on professional 
expenses, with its recognized potential for over-deduction. Here, the treatment group 
mean deduction is 791 CHF versus only 349 CHF for the control group, a difference 
that is statistical significance (z = 2.71).  
 
4.1.3 Under-reporting of Wealth 
Results for the under-reporting of wealth return a very similar picture. The treatment 
group demonstrates higher values of non-compliance (M = 3,072 CHF) compared to 
the control group (M = -12,431 CHF), a difference that borders on statistical 
significance (Prob > |z| =   0.102). It should be noted, however, that in the wealth 
analysis, observations are lost (i.e., n = 197 in the control group and 206 in the 
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treatment group). Nevertheless, fewer corrections are apparent: in 81.20% (80.20%) 
of the cases in the treatment (control group), the tax administration made no changes 
to the tax declaration, an obviously small and statistically insignificant difference.7 In 
the corrected cases only, 51.3% (46.2%) of the taxpayers in the control (treatment) 
group reported more net wealth than required.  
 
Table 1 
Summary of Results  
 Income   
Under-declaration  
of Income 
SD 
   
 Taxable Income1 Share2  
No  Corrections 
Made 
 M (CHF) M (CHF)   
Control group (n = 248) 1,525 58767 66255 2.30% 43.65% 
Treatment group (n = 
252) -192  16837 65102 0.29% 46.37% 
Two-sample Wilcoxon z =   0.271    z =   0.611 
rank-sum (Mann-
Whitney) test      
      
 Deductions   
 Over-deductions    Deductions1 Share2 No Corrections 
 M (CHF) SD M (CHF)  Made 
      
Control group (n = 246) 816 10293 13311 6.13% 34.96 
Treatment group n 
=253) 1351 4737 14115 9.57% 31.23 
Two-sample Wilcoxon z =  2.747    z =   0.886 
rank-sum (Mann-
Whitney) test      
      
 
Wealth 
Under-declaration of Wealth Taxable  Wealth1 Share2  
 M (CHF) SD M (CHF)  
No Corrections 
Made 
Control group (n = 197) -12431 151369 57585 21.60% 80.20% 
Treatment group (n = 
206) 3072 38957 108817 2.82% 81.55% 
Two-sample Wilcoxon z =  1.636    z = 0.344 
rank-sum (Mann-
Whitney) test      
      
Notes: 1 Values corrected by the tax administration. 2 Column 2 divided by column 4.  
                                                 
7 What remains unclear is whether a moral suasion letter could also induce pressure to comply and thus 
crowd out taxpayers’ willingness to comply and lead to an insignificant or even negative influence. I 
am thankful to Katharina Gangl for suggesting this interpretation.  
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3.2 Multivariate Analysis 
Having obtained a large set of additional variables from the tax administration (based 
on the tax forms), I then apply a multivariate analysis8 that makes a valuable 
contribution to the limited knowledge in the tax compliance literature about the actual 
determinants of tax compliance using directly tax declaration data. I present OLS 
regressions with robust standard errors for heteroskedasticity as errors may increase 
with income or wealth. It is clear from Table 2 that the treatment dummy renamed as 
MORAL SUASION is never statistically significant. Thus, the difference between the 
control and treatment groups for over-deductions is no longer statistically significant. 
The U-shaped relationships between age and over-deduction and the reverse relation 
between age and wealth under-declaration are particularly interesting. It is also worth 
mentioning that in the wealth analysis, Protestants and Catholics have a higher level 
of tax compliance than those from other denominations or without a denomination. 
Looking at the same dependent variable, I further observe that homeowners are more 
compliant. However, such a result should be treated with caution as homeownership is 
also wealth related; thus an inference of a causal relationship is problematic. Taxable 
income, on the other hand, is only relevant for over-deduction for which it returns a 
negative coefficient. Interestingly, however, tax declarations made on a computer are 
more likely to over-report deductions and under-declare wealth. Nevertheless, these 
findings should be treated with caution since the R-squared values are very low. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 In the case of married couples who fill out a joint tax return,  I use the variable information for the 
main income earner. I also run a correlation matrix to check for any issues of multicollinearity. 
Although relatively high correlations emerge between AGE and HOMEOWNER (r = 0.385) and AGE 
and DONE ON A COMPUTER (r = 0.362), these values  are below the critical value of 0.8. 
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Table 2 
Determinants of Non-Compliance 
 
OLS OVER-
DEDUCTIONS 
UNDER-
DECLARATION OF 
INCOME 
UNDER-
DECLARATION OF 
WEALTH 
Dependent Variable      
 (1) (2) (3) 
       
    
MORAL SUASION 785.166 -1674.005 5358.442 
 (1.08) (-0.43) (0.88) 
AGE -278.598** 120.603 1315.154* 
 (-2.11) (0.15) (1.67) 
AGE SQUARED 2.341** -1.159 -10.021 
 (2.08) (-0.17) (-1.46) 
FEMALE 328.699 -4490.338 -9615.241 
 (0.52) (-0.65) (-0.92) 
SWISS 141.508 4692.180 27053.670 
 (0.19) (0.72) (1.12) 
MARRIED 254.785 -6671.359 1770.238 
  (0.24) (-0.90) (0.14) 
CATHOLIC -907.826 -3028.389 -15472.500** 
 (-1.54) (-0.66) (-2.03) 
PROTESTANT -1889.816 969.881 -18421.210** 
 (-1.53) (0.17) (-2.43) 
TAXABLE INCOME -0.016* -0.045 -0.203 
 (-1.70) (-0.96) (-1.00) 
SELF-EMPLOYED -500.264 5330.595 16110.340 
 (-0.49) (1.49) (0.97) 
HOMEOWNER -687.392 7733.736 -18282.740* 
 (-0.69) (1.46) (-1.66) 
DONE ON A COMPUTER 1629.651*** -1369.490 10786.450* 
 (2.52) (-0.91) (1.78) 
Number of observations 489 490 394 
R-squared 0.035 0.016 0.057 
Notes: Robust standard errors. The reference groups are as follows: CONTROL GROUP (NO 
LETTER), MALE, OTHER NATIONALITIES, NO LONGER MARRIED (SINGLE, 
DIVORCED, SEPARATED, WIDOWED), NO DENOMINATION OR OTHER RELIGION, 
NOT SELF-EMPLOYED, RENTING, DONE BY HAND OR ON A TYPWRITER. Significance 
levels: *0.05 < p < 0.10, **0.01< p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01; t-values in parentheses.  
 
In line with Blumenthal et al. (2001) I also explore the interaction between 
moral suasion and such variables as income, self-employment (greater opportunity 
costs), and home ownership (more permanent/long-term connection to the immediate 
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community). In most cases, the interaction term is not statistically significant. It is 
only for income non-compliance that homeowners appear more receptive to moral 
suasion than other taxpayers, with a t-value that borders on statistical significance at 
1.65.  
 
4. Conclusions 
Slemrod and Weber (2012), referring to Angrist and Pischke’s (2010) commentary on 
better research design in empirical econometrics, put forward the following criticism:   
with regard to the empirical analysis of tax evasion and the informal economy, 
the credibility revolution has, for the most part, not yet arrived … not because 
of inattention by creative empirical researchers … [but] because severe 
measurement problems plague empirical analysis in this context, problems that 
arise not by chance, but because of the nature of the subject matter. (p. 50)  
Such natural field experiments as mine offer an opportunity to promote the credibility 
revolution in the study of tax evasion because of the unique advantages they offer. 
First, in a best-case scenario, one in which individuals have no choice but to 
participate, they are broadly generalizable. Second, by “combining randomization and 
realism …, [they] provide a different parameter estimate than do laboratory, 
artefactual, and framed field experiments” (List, 2011, p. 6). In this present study, the 
treatments were implemented by the tax authority, thereby evoking real processes that 
allow observation of taxpayer behaviour in its usual environment outside the 
laboratory setting (Torgler, 2004).   
The strength of this field experiment, compared to those by Blumenthal et al. 
(2001) and Slemrod et al. (2001), for example, is that my access to the outcomes of 
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taxpayer audits9 allowed me to work with a large set of (dependent) variables 
(income, wealth, and deductions). Yet the results remain consistent with previous 
findings that moral suasion has barely any effect on tax compliance, even when the 
analysis is at the local level where moral suasion might be more effective than at the 
national level. Using a multivariate analysis to explore other determinants of tax 
compliance, I observe that religious denomination seems to matter for wealth 
underreporting as does the age profile which is also significant with respect to over-
deductions.  
Obviously, the study has limitations; in particular, the inability to differentiate 
between intentional and non-intentional errors or deviations from compliance as I 
only had access to the completed individual tax declaration forms and the final figures 
reported by the tax administration after the auditing process. The tax administration 
did not inform me which non-compliant taxpayers were actually fined, nor did they 
advise what sort of information they relied on when making the corrections. The 
relatively large share of corrections made by the tax administration may well indicate 
that the observed deviations are more likely to be errors than intentional misreporting. 
For income and wealth under-declaration, especially, as opposed to deductions, the 
magnitude of these corrections is quite small, yet individuals can evade taxes on 
wealth and income in ways other than wrong declarations. Not only it is impossible to 
observe such activities using this type of data, but the study may suffer from a ceiling 
effect.10 That is, in Switzerland, tax compliance and procedural fairness are already 
very high, so trying to increase them with a moral suasion letter may simply have no 
                                                 
9 List (2011) argues that “original experiments represent a long-term investment in building the trust of 
the organization” (p. 13). I spent one day per week at the tax administration in Trimbach for a period of 
six months. Such a weekly interaction over several months was valuable in building a good relationship 
with the tax administration which may have contributed to the opportunity of working with such a 
unique dataset.  
10 I would like to thank guest editor Erich Kirchler for pointing out this problem.  
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additional effect. It is thus important to understand how such letters shape tax 
compliance in other countries with lower tax compliance. Moreover, there is no 
guarantee that the individuals in the treatment group actually read the letter although 
the experimental design tried to minimize such a problem. In addition, as both 
Blumenthal et al. (2001) and Torgler (2004) point out, more research is needed on the 
short-term versus the long-term effects of repeated moral suasion messages and 
communication with taxpayers, particularly with respect to different types of 
messages and different communication methods.  
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Appendix 
Figure A1  
Sample of the Letter 
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Sample of the letter (translation) 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
 
As at the beginning of every year, you have just received the tax form. The taxes you pay are 
vital for maintaining the municipal tasks in Trimbach. If the taxpayers did not contribute their 
share, our commune with its 6,226 inhabitants would suffer greatly. With your taxes, you help 
keep Trimbach attractive for its inhabitants. 
In Switzerland, contrary to other countries, the citizens have the opportunity to 
actively participate in the legislative procedure. This advantage is also reflected in the tax 
legislation, which stipulates taxpayer self-declaration. This Swiss system presupposes that 
citizens have a sense of responsibility and are ready to maintain the functioning of 
municipalities, cantons, and the state. With your conscientious tax declaration you contribute 
to preserving this democratic and liberal structure. 
If you encounter any difficulties or doubts when filling in your tax declaration, please 
refer to the green sheet enclosed with the form. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Your tax administrator 
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Figure A2 
Income Declaration Sheet  
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Figure A3 
Tax Declaration Deduction Sheet 
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Figure A4 
Wealth Declaration Sheet 
 
 
 
